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Litigation
This Note explores the difficulties toxic tort plaintiffs face in
attempting to establish that their exposures to known hazardous
substances, rather than some independent factor, caused their
diseases.  Through an analysis of federal district court and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, this Note examines how ap-
plication of traditional tort burdens of proof to the realm of toxic
tort litigation has imposed nearly insurmountable barriers for in-
jured plaintiffs seeking relief.  This Note examines in detail the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Lit-
igation , a July 2002 case that only marginally relaxed the eviden-
tiary burden toxic tort plaintiffs must meet in order to establish
causation.  Significantly, although the ruling may be useful to a
limited number of In re Hanford  plaintiffs, the effect of the
court’s opinion is largely illusory when viewed within the context
of existing burdens to recovery.  This Note concludes that federal
legislation should be enacted to provide fair and just compensa-
tion to plaintiffs in mass toxic tort cases, such as In re Hanford ,
so long as those plaintiffs are able to meet prescribed minimum
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burdens relating to epidemiological and statistical proof of
causation.
Part I of this Note examines the ongoing In re Hanford  litiga-
tion, including the historical underpinnings of the case and the
Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion clarifying the parameters of rela-
tive risk and the use of statistical evidence in toxic tort litigation.
Part II discusses the use of scientific evidence and expert testi-
mony in toxic tort litigation as well as the development of eviden-
tiary standards related to such evidence, starting with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals .  Part III then examines the statistical basis of relative-risk
calculations and the rationale for the “doubling of the risk” stan-
dard that nearly all courts employ.  Part IV surveys the field of
scholarly opinion concerning both the perceived overreliance
and underreliance of courts on relative-risk calculations and the
epidemiological data upon which such calculations are based.  Fi-
nally, Part V analyzes a number of proposed theories for refor-




A. History of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation
The Hanford Nuclear Reservation, located in southeastern
Washington, is a 560-square-mile1 plutonium production facility
built in 1943 to meet the needs of the Manhattan Project.2  The
work of manufacturing weapons-grade plutonium began at the
facility early in 1944, and reached its peak in the late 1940s and
early 1950s during the nuclear proliferation of the Cold War.3
Production continued until the last plant was deactivated in De-
cember 1988.4  Unbeknownst to people living in the vicinity of
Hanford, airborne emissions5 of radioactive substances also
1 Elouise Schumacher, U.S. Confirms Health Risks Near Hanford in ‘40s, ‘50s ,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 12, 1990, at A1 [hereinafter Health Risks].
2 Gayle Greene, In the Afterglow:  Environmental Problems Caused by Nuclear
Weapons Plant in Hanford , Washington , THE NATION, Feb. 28, 1994, at 46.
3 See Health Risks , supra  note 1, at A1.
4 Elouise Schumacher, Fallout of Radiation Revelation:  A Flurry of Questions ,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 29, 1990, at A1 [hereinafter Questions].
5 Smaller amounts of radioactive emissions were also discharged directly into the
Columbia River from 1944 until the last of Hanford’s eight original production reac-
tors was shut down in 1971. Id.
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peaked during the facility’s first decade of operation (although
new releases continued well into the 1970s), blanketing
thousands of square miles of Washington and Oregon with radio-
active isotopes such as iodine-131 and plutonium-239.6
As early as 1951, Hanford officials were aware that airborne
emissions from the site posed a significant health risk to persons
in the surrounding vicinity.7  It wasn’t until July 12, 1990, how-
ever, when the United States Department of Energy’s Hanford
Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project published a report
entitled “Initial Hanford Radiation Dose Estimates,” that the
fears of thousands of Washington and Oregon “downwinders”
were substantiated.  The report focused on Hanford’s releases of
radioactive iodine8 and concluded that over 685,000 curies9 were
released into the air from 1944 to 1947—with over 340,000 curies
6 Official estimates of the level of iodine-131 released from Hanford between 1944
and 1956 are as follows: 1944—54,000 curies; 1945—340,000 curies; 1946—76,000
curies; 1947—24,000 curies; 1948—1,200 curies ; 1949—7,900 curies ; 1950—4,000
curies; 1951—18,800 curies; 1952—1,000 curies; 1953—700 curies ; 1954—500 curies;
1955—1,100 curies; 1956—400 curies. Health Risks , supra  note 1 at A1.  The air-
borne radiation emissions were detected as far south as Klamath Falls, Oregon, and
as far north as Spokane, Washington. Questions , supra  note 4, at A1.
7 On January 12, 1951, a Hanford official acknowledged the health risks, stating:
“[t]he particle problem still remains, in my opinion, a very serious health problem.
This problem is present in other A.E.C. [Atomic Energy Commission] manufactur-
ing plants and will be important in new installations, not only from the standpoint of
real injury but because of the extreme difficulty of defense in cases of litigation.”
Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint at 26, para. 31, In re  Hanford Nuclear Reserva-
tion Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash 1991) (No. CY-91-3015-AAM). See also
Greene supra  note 2, at 46 (detailing early challenges to the government’s assur-
ances about the harmlessness of radioactive emissions from Hanford including stud-
ies by Dr. Ernest Sternglass showing increased infant mortality around Hanford
between 1943 and 1954, and the case of Dr. Thomas Mancuso, who was hired by the
Atomic Energy Commission to study the health effects of radiation at Hanford only
to be defunded when his study turned up high incidences of cancer).
8 Researchers focused on radioactive iodine, which is an especially troublesome
material because it is readily absorbed by the human thyroid gland.  Once absorbed,
radioactive iodine causes cancer and affects the gland’s ability to properly regulate
growth and metabolism. See  Steve Green, Thousands Exposed to Radiation in ‘40s,
New Study Shows , UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 13, 1990, available at  LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File.
9 Dick Clever, Study May Affect Hanford Lawsuit , SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, April 20, 1994, at A1.  Radioactive isotopes such as iodine 131 are unsta-
ble—and hence radioactive—due to an excess number of protons or neutrons in
their nuclei. See  David S. Gooden, Radiation Injury and the Law , 1989 BYU L.
REV. 1155, 1160 (1989).  Radioactive isotopes stabilize themselves by giving off en-
ergy in the form of radiation. Id.  An element is radioactive for as long as it takes
the nucleus of that element to shed enough protons or neutrons for it to become
evenly balanced. Id.  A curie is the traditional measure for radioactivity with one
curie representing 3.7 times 10 disintegrations per second. Id.  at 1162.
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emitted by the facility in 1945 alone.10  In comparison, the 1979
Three Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania released just
fifteen curies of radioactive iodine,11 while the 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear accident in the former Soviet Union released an esti-
mated 6,000,000 curies of radioactive iodine.12  Based on data
contained in the government’s report, experts estimated that ap-
proximately 55,000 individuals could have been exposed to radia-
tion levels high enough to cause adverse health effects.13  The
most disturbing revelations to surface from the government’s re-
port concerned details of the 1949 “Green Run,” a large-scale,
deliberate  release of radioactive emissions from Hanford, under-
taken at the behest of the U.S. military, in order to test equip-
ment that had been set up to monitor the Soviet Union’s
emerging nuclear-weapons arsenal.14
B. In re Hanford at the District Court Level
Soon after the Department of Energy released its report docu-
menting the long-term, large-scale release of radioactive sub-
stances from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, thousands of
individuals living within the affected regions of southeastern
Washington and northern Oregon filed suit.15  In February 1991,
these separate actions were consolidated into a single lawsuit: In
re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation .16
10 Health Risks , supra  note 1, at A1.  Many other radioactive or toxic materials
were also released from Hanford during that time, including cesium, strontium, plu-
tonium, phosphorus, zinc, copper, neptunium, arsenic, chromium, manganese and
krypton. Questions , supra  note 4, at A1.
11 Health Risks , supra  note 1, at A1.
12 Questions , supra  note 4, at A1.
13 Id.
14 Trisha T. Pritkin, Hanford:  Where Traditional Common Law Fails , 30 GONZ. L.
REV. 523, 566 n.47 (1994); Questions , supra  note 4, at A1; Greene, supra  note 2, at
46.
15 In re  Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., CV-91-3015-AAM 1998 WL 775340,
at *1 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 1998).
16 Id.  The cases consolidated into In re Hanford  are as follows: Evenson v. EPA,
CY-90-3067-AAM; Hamilton v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., CY-90-3069-AAM;
Wahpat v. General Electric Co., CY-90-3091-AAM; Criswell v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., CY-90-3106-AAM; Jaros v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., CY-
90-3107. Id.  at *1.  Subsequent to the February 1991 consolidation, several addi-
tional cases were also consolidated into In re Hanford . Id.  at *2.  These later cases
are as follows: Roseman v. General Elec. Co., CY-91-3045-AAM; Seaman v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., CY-91-3080-AAM; Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., CY-92-3069-AAM; Durfey v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., CY-93-3087-
AAM; Thomson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., CY-94-3067-AAM. Id.
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The consolidated action was refiled in federal court in the
Eastern District of Washington as a class-action lawsuit consist-
ing of plaintiffs who alleged that the operators of Hanford had
acted intentionally and negligently in contaminating the region
surrounding Hanford, thereby causing their illnesses.17  Plaintiffs’
consolidated complaint sought recovery “for redress for present
and threatened future injuries resulting from Defendants’ wrong-
doing in the generation, storage, and use of vast quantities of ra-
dioactive . . . hazardous substances at [Hanford] and the release
of those substances into the environment.”18  The In re Hanford
plaintiffs alleged injuries including thyroid cancer, non-neoplastic
thyroid diseases, and various non-thyroid cancers such as breast
cancer, brain cancer, and lymphoma.19  The five defendant com-
panies named in the complaint—E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., General Electric Co., UNC Nuclear Industries, Atlantic
Richfield Co., and Rockwell International—all manufactured
plutonium at the facility between 1943 and 1987.20
The district court divided the consolidated In re Hanford  liti-
gation into three phases.21  The first phase permitted discovery
by plaintiffs of Hanford’s operating and emissions history while
allowing the defendants to conduct discovery related to individ-
ual plaintiffs’ exposures, medical histories, and relevant ill-
nesses.22  Although originally scheduled to last one year, this
17 The district court, commenting on the enormity of the litigation, stated:
Plaintiffs, who conceivably could number into the hundreds of thousands,
consist of all those persons who, at some time during the last 50 years,
resided and/or had some property interest in an area which covers most of
southeastern Washington, a portion of northeastern Oregon, and a small
portion of western Idaho. . . . Given the scope of the plantiffs’ claims, par-
ticularly with regard to the number and differing types of emissions and the
differing harms alleged to have resulted from each, the potential enormity
of this litigation, as well as the dollar amount of any recovery, is almost
staggering.
In re  Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).
18 In re  Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551, 1555 (E.D. Wash.
1991) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint).
19 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 1998 WL 775340, at *2.  On Septem-
ber 20, 1996, the claims of numerous In re Hanford  plaintiffs were severed from that
litigation and consolidated as Berg v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 293 F.3d 1127
(9th Cir. 2002).  The Berg  plaintiffs sought damages for emotional distress and medi-
cal monitoring due to their exposure to radiation; however, the Berg  plaintiffs did
not claim physical injuries based on their exposures. Id.  at 1129.
20 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 1998 WL 775340, at *2.
21 Id.
22 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 292 F.3d at 1129.
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initial phase of the litigation was extended three times in three
years and did not conclude until March 1995.23  The second phase
of the litigation was designed to focus on causation and included
disclosure of all scientific expert witnesses and the filing of expert
reports by both sides.24  The third phase was designed to encom-
pass general liability and any other pre-trial issues.25
Once the second phase of discovery began, the district court
granted plaintiffs’ request to bifurcate the causation phase into
two separate stages.26  The first stage would focus on “generic
causation,” while the second would focus on “individual causa-
tion.”27  Although the district court did not precisely define these
two terms, generic causation is generally understood as a deter-
mination of whether a toxic/radioactive agent has the capacity  to
cause the diseases complained of by plaintiff,28 while individual
causation is a determination of whether the toxic/radioactive
agent actually did  cause a particular plaintiff’s disease.29
During discovery on the issue of generic causation the In re
Hanford  plaintiffs and defendants developed “fundamentally dif-
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 1998 WL 775340, at *2.
26 Id.
27 Id.  at *4.
28 In its hearing on defendant’s summary judgment motion at the conclusion of
the generic causation phase, the district court defined generic causation as asking the
question of “whether an agent is capable of causing a particular disease.” In re Han-
ford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 1998 WL 775340, at *4. (citing Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part)).  Similarly, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit defined generic causation as
“the capacity of a toxic agent, such as radiation, to cause the illnesses complained of
by plaintiffs.” In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 292 F.3d at 1129.
29 The district court did not specifically define what it meant by “individual causa-
tion” in either its order to bifurcate the causation phase or in its ruling on defen-
dant’s summary judgment motion.  The Ninth Circuit, however, understood the term
to mean that once generic causation was established “‘individual causation’ answers
whether that toxic agent actually caused a particular plaintiff’s illness.” In re Han-
ford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 292 F.3d at 1129 (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also In re  “Agent Orange” Litig., 818
F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[t]he relevant question . . . is not whether Agent
Orange has the capacity to cause harm the generic causation issue, but whether it
did  cause harm and to whom.  That determination is highly individualistic, and de-
pends upon the characteristics of individual plaintiffs . . . and the nature of their
exposure to Agent Orange.”); Jones v. Allercare, Inc, 203 F.R.D. 290, 301 (N.D.
Ohio 2001) (“the relevant question in this case will not be whether the products
have the capacity to cause harm, but whether the products caused harm and to
whom.  Thus, the real causation issue in this case is individual, not general, in
nature.”).
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ferent views on the nature of plaintiffs’ burden.”30  Plaintiffs ar-
gued that, consistent with the generally recognized meaning of
generic causation, they needed only to prove that emissions re-
leased from Hanford had the capacity to cause their claimed dis-
eases.31  Defendants, however, maintained that, under the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals ,32
plaintiffs could not proceed to the individual causation stage un-
less they could offer proof that, for each claimed disease, the rel-
evant plaintiff had been exposed to a dose of radiation that
statistically doubled his or her risk of harm.33  Based on their un-
derstanding of plaintiffs’ burden of proof, the defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment at the conclusion of discovery on
generic causation.  Defendants claimed that plaintiffs had failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
reported emissions from Hanford had resulted in a statistical
doubling of the risk of harm for any plaintiff.34
In July 1998, in a 762-page order, the district court in large part
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment adopting de-
fendants’ understanding of the burden of proof needed for plain-
tiffs to advance past the generic causation phase.  The court
concluded that proof concerning whether radiation is capable of
causing a given illness raises only a “possibility” that radiation is
in fact the cause of that illness.35  Relying heavily on its interpre-
tation of Daubert , the court wrote:  “Such evidence invites a jury
to speculate whether radiation exposure is in fact a cause of the
injury and, by itself, is of no assistance to a jury.”36  The court
noted that because the In re Hanford  plaintiffs lacked direct
proof of causation, they instead had to use scientific evidence
30 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 1998 WL 775340, at *3.
31 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 292 F.3d at 1130.
32 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
33 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 292 F.3d at 1130.
34 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 1998 WL 775340, at *3.  In their mo-
tion for summary judgment, defendants conceded that radiation exposure is “capa-
ble of causing” several illnesses complained of by the plaintiffs including thyroid
cancer and non-autoimmune hypothyroidism. Id . at *4.  The defendants, however,
did not agree with the plaintiffs concerning the exposure levels at which radiation
was “capable of causing” these illnesses. Id.  Defendants also argued that plaintiffs’
evidence was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
radiation was “capable of causing” the majority of other illnesses that plaintiffs al-
leged were caused by radioactive emissions from Hanford. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.  (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320-22 (9th Cir.
1995)).
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and expert testimony based on epidemiological data.37  The dis-
trict court concluded that, regardless of whether such data is used
at a generic or individual causation stage, if epidemiological data
and statistical proof are relied upon to establish causation, such
scientific evidence “meets the ‘more-likely-than-not’ sufficiency
standard only if a ‘doubling of risk’ is shown.”38  Based on this
conclusion, the court held that to survive summary judgment on
the issue of generic causation, each plaintiff had to prove not
only that radiation is capable of causing the injury in question,
but that he or she had been exposed to a threshold dose of radia-
tion that statistically doubled his or her risk of harm.39
The district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs had to demon-
strate a doubling of the risk to survive summary judgment on
generic causation resulted in the exclusion of seventeen of the
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses who had not concluded that Han-
ford’s radiation emissions resulted in a doubling of the risk to
any particular plaintiff.40  The court then established threshold
levels of radiation exposure for each particular illness41 and dis-
missed any claim where the plaintiff had not been exposed to the
official doubling dose, regardless of any other particularized evi-
dence.42  As a result of the district court’s requirement that plain-
tiffs establish a doubling-of-the-risk in order to advance past the
generic causation stage, the vast majority of the Hanford
downwinders’ claims were dismissed.43
37 Id.  at *5.
38 Id.
39 Id.  at *10.
40 See In re  Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir.
2002).
41 For example, the court held that those plaintiffs asserting thyroid cancer claims
had not presented a genuine issue of material fact and could not survive summary
judgment unless their exposure to radioactive iodine was greater than five rads for
plaintiffs aged zero to four when exposed; ten rads for plaintiffs aged five to nine
when exposed; thirty-three rads for those aged ten to nineteen when exposed; and
one hundred rads for those who were twenty and over when exposed. Id.  While a
“curie” measures the amount of radioactive material emitted during the decay of an
unstable particle, a radiation absorbed dose, or “rad,” is defined as the deposition of
one hundred ergs of energy in one gram of material (in this case the human body)
from ionization due to radiation emissions. See  Thomas W. Lippman, Nuclear Ex-
change Brewing at N.R.C.; Becquerel, Gray and Sievert May Obliterate Curie, Rad
and Rem , WASH. POST, July 19, 1989, at A21.
42 See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. , 292 F.3d at 1132.
43 The only remaining claims after summary judgment were those meeting the
district court’s strict age, time, proximity, and dose requirements for thyroid cancer,
non-autoimmune clinical and subclinical hypothyroidism, bone cancer, lung cancer,
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C. The In re Hanford Plaintiffs’ Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
The In re Hanford  plaintiffs immediately appealed the district
court’s grant of summary judgement to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.  Plaintiffs raised three main arguments, all of which
were based upon what they perceived as the district court’s erro-
neous conclusion that Daubert  mandated a threshold showing
that a doubling-of-the-risk had occurred at the generic causation
stage.44  Plaintiffs argued that, by adopting the “doubling-of-the-
risk” standard, the district court had prematurely decided issues
of individual causation.45  Further, plaintiffs contended that the
district court’s discovery order led them to believe that to survive
summary judgment on generic causation they needed only to
meet the “capable-of-causing” standard, not the doubling-of-risk
standard; therefore, they argued, the district court had
prejudiced plaintiffs’ case because their understanding of the ge-
neric causation standard had shaped their production of expert
reports.46
Nearly four years later, on June 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling in an opin-
ion that significantly clarified and narrowed application of the
“doubling of the risk” standard in toxic tort litigation in the
Ninth Circuit.47  The appellate court disagreed strongly with the
district court’s conclusion that a doubling-of-the-risk was re-
quired to advance past the generic causation phase and instead
credited plaintiffs’ argument that generic causation only ad-
dresses whether radiation exposure was “capable of causing”
plaintiffs’ claimed illnesses.48  The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the trial court had “in essence skipped the generic causation in-
quiry and decided issues of individual causation without the ben-
efit of full discovery or particularized medical evidence.”49
More importantly, the Ninth Circuit went on to hold that when
considering the issue of individual causation in the In re Hanford
litigation, it was erroneous to hold that a doubling-of-the-risk
salivary cancer, and breast cancer if the female plaintiff was lactating at the time of
the exposure. See id.
44 See id.  at 1133.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.  at 1133-37, 1139.
48 Id.  at 1134.
49 Id.  at 1134-35.
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was a strict requirement before causation could be established.50
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit held that both the defendants and
the district court had improperly interpreted Daubert  as uni-
formly mandating a doubling-of-the-risk standard when plaintiffs
in toxic tort cases rely on epidemiological proof and statistical
evidence to establish causation.51  The Ninth Circuit concluded
that Daubert ’s holding was inapposite to In re Hanford  because
in Daubert  the plaintiffs lacked scientific evidence showing that
the drug in question (Bendectin) was even capable of causing
plaintiff’s birth defects.52  In contrast to the complete lack of evi-
dence supporting generic causation in Daubert  (i.e., whether
Bendectin was capable of causing birth defects), the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that scientific and legal authority had long recognized
that “[r]adiation is capable of causing a broad range of illnesses,
even at the lowest doses.”53
Because there was no dispute as to whether radiation was ca-
pable of causing the illnesses the In re Hanford  plaintiffs alleged,
the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred in requir-
ing plaintiffs to prove exposure to a set threshold level of radia-
tion that resulted in a doubling of their risk for contracting any
particular illness.54  Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the “va-
lidity of a claim should not depend on whether a plaintiff was
exposed to a fraction of a rem lower than the ‘doubling dose’”55
and concluded that “common sense alone mitigates against es-
50 Id.  at 1135.
51 Id.  at 1136-37.
52 Id.  The Ninth Circuit stated, “The only evidence plaintiffs had that Bendectin
caused their own birth defects was (1) proof that their mothers took Bendectin dur-
ing pregnancy, and (2) epidemiological evidence that mothers who used Bendectin
during pregnancy bore more children with birth defects than mothers who did not
use Bendectin.” Id.  at 1136.
53 Id.  at 1137.  The Ninth Circuit also distinguished Schudel v. General Electric
Co ., 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997), the only other Ninth Circuit case cited by the
defendants and the district court as supporting their conclusions that the In re Han-
ford  plaintiffs were required to meet the doubling of the risk standard during the
generic causation stage. Id.  at 1136.  The Ninth Circuit noted that, in Schudel , the
“sole causation evidence” put forth by plaintiffs to meet the more likely than not
burden of proof under Washington state tort law was expert testimony that exposure
to defendant’s cleaning solvents “could possibly” have caused one of the plaintiff’s
neurological symptoms. Id.  Because the Schudel  plaintiffs lacked any other evi-
dence of causation, their claims were required to meet the same substantiation re-
quirements of Daubert . Id.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Schudel  from In
re Hanford  on the same grounds as Daubert . Id.  at 1133-37.
54 Id.  at 1137.
55 Id.
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tablishing a bright line threshold for safe irradiation.”56
Based on its holding that the doubling of risk standard should
not be employed as a strict, threshold requirement once the ca-
pacity of a given substance to cause a plaintiff’s complained-of
illness is established, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that the
district court committed reversible error by excluding plaintiffs’
experts simply because those experts had failed to conclude that
a doubling-of-risk had occurred.57
II
PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION IN TOXIC
TORT LITIGATION
A. Distinguishing Toxic Tort Causation from Traditional
Tort Causation
The In re Hanford  plaintiffs’ difficulties with establishing that
large-scale emissions of highly radioactive substances from the
Hanford Nuclear Reservation, rather than some other indepen-
dent factor, caused their documented medical conditions is com-
monly described as the “problem of the indeterminate
plaintiff.”58  Numerous plaintiffs in other toxic tort cases have
56 Id.  (quoting In re  TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 727 n.179 (3d Cir. 1999)).
57 Id.  at 1138-39.
58 The “problem of the indeterminate plaintiff,” which is the focus of this Note,
must be distinguished from what is commonly referred to as the “problem of the
indeterminate defendant,” which, in and of itself, stands as a substantial evidentiary
burden for plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation.  This problem arises when a plaintiff
cannot ascertain which of the various defendants was actually responsible for pro-
ducing the specific toxic substance to which plaintiff attributes his injuries. See
Christopher L. Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation , 23
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605, 612 (1991).  Over the last several decades, certain courts consid-
ering the problem of the indeterminate defendant have refused to deny recovery to
plaintiffs despite seemingly insurmountable proof problems.  Instead, these courts
have fashioned innovative liability schemes that stretch the boundaries of traditional
tort causation principles.  The most notable of these schemes are enterprise liability,
adopted in Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co ., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), and the market share liability schemes adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories , 607 P.2d 924 (1980), and by the New York
Court of Appeals in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 539 N.E.2d 1069 (1989).
In Hall , plaintiffs were children who had been injured when blasting caps they
were playing with exploded.  345 F. Supp. at 359.  The explosion destroyed the blast-
ing caps, thus making it impossible to identify the particular manufacturer of the
blasting caps at issue. Id.  at 372.  Refusing to dismiss the case despite this lack of
proof, the Hall  court held that joint knowledge and action in failing to provide a
warning label on the blasting caps was sufficient to state a claim for relief against all
the manufacturers of such blasting caps. Id.  at 373-74.  The Hall  court held that
“joint control may be shown . . . [by] evidence that defendants, acting independently,
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faced similar proof problems.59  In fact, commentators have long
argued that the peculiar nature of toxic tort injuries creates a vir-
tually insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs who attempt to estab-
lish that a causal link exists between a given toxic exposure and
adhered to an industry-wide standard or custom with regard to the safety features of
blasting caps.” Id.  at 374.
Sindell  involved a suit by children who had developed birth defects as a result of
their mothers’ ingestion of the morning sickness pill DES.  607 P.2d at 925.  There
had been numerous manufacturers of the drug and no plaintiff could identify any
one of them as having manufactured the drug actually ingested by their mother. Id.
Again, the court refused to dismiss the suit and instead stretched the bounds of
traditional tort causation to hold defendants liable.  Under the theory developed by
the Sindell  court, once the plaintiffs joined the manufacturers of a substantial share
of the California market for the product that caused the injury, “each defendant
[would be] held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of
that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which
caused plaintiff’s injuries.” Id.  at 937.
Hymowitz  involved a similar factual setting as Sindell  but with the New York
Court of Appeals taking a slightly different approach to market share liability.  First,
the court allowed plaintiffs to name defendants representing a substantial share of
the national  DES market, with liability being based upon a particular defendant’s
share of that market.  539 N.E.2d at 1085.  Further, unlike Sindell , the defendants
were not allowed to exculpate themselves from liability even if they could prove
their particular drug was not ingested by any plaintiff’s mother. Id.  at 1089.  Thus,
the only way a defendant could avoid liability was for that defendant to prove that it
either had never marketed DES or that it had not marketed DES for use during
pregnancy. Id.  at 1092.  A defendant who marketed DES for use during pregnancy
but whose product the plaintiff’s mother could not have ingested because it was not
marketed in the relevant geographical area could still be held liable. See also , Abel
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984) (adopting an alternative liability
scheme under which all alleged tortfeasors must be joined as defendants); Martin v.
Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (adopting what the court termed “market-
share alternate liability” under which all defendants who are unable to clear them-
selves from liability are presumed to have equal market shares totaling 100%).
Commentators have suggested that mass toxic tort litigation cases involving inde-
terminate defendants present an ideal context for bending the traditional tort recov-
ery requirements, even in the absence of a clear causal link. See , e.g ., Callahan,
supra  note 58, at 614-16.  These commentators argue that eliminating the need for a
plaintiff to identify a particular defendant as having caused his injuries does not
defeat the principle that a defendant should properly be held liable for only the
injuries that it has caused. Id . at 616.  This is so because (theoretically, at least)
under a liability scheme such as market share liability, if every injured person were
to file suit in a jurisdiction that had adopted market share liability, each defendant
would only be held liable for that part of the damage it actually caused. Id.  In this
way, the traditional underpinnings of tort law are upheld, despite the reformulation
of proof requirements.
59 See , e.g. , Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995); In
re  Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re  “Agent Orange” Prod.
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
247 (D. Utah 1984); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.
1997); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992).
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the later onset of their illness.60  This distinct problem necessi-
tates a different undertaking than the establishment of causation
in more traditional tort cases.  The difference is due primarily to
the absence of any objectively verifiable causal chain in toxic tort
cases and because a toxic tort plaintiff’s injury is neither trau-
matic nor sudden.61  Instead, injuries caused by toxic/radioactive
exposures, such as those in In re Hanford , occur as unobservable,
sub-cellular chemical disruptions after prolonged exposure to
both the substance in question and a myriad of other substances
which may or may not themselves be harmful to the individual.62
The unobservable nature of such injuries are, in turn, followed by
a long latency period before any signs of illness can be
detected.63
60 See , e.g ., Callahan, supra  note 58, at 605-06; Trisha T. Pritikin, Hanford:  Where
Traditional Common Law Fails , 30 GONZ. L. REV. 523 (1995-1996); David Rosen-
berg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the
Tort System ,  97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 869 (1984); Melissa Moore Thompson, Causal
Inference in Epidemiology:  Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation , 71 N.C. L. REV.
247, 251 (1992).
61 For a detailed analysis of the reasons why causation is more problematic in
toxic tort litigation see Allen v. United States , 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d
on other grounds , 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
The Allen  court observed three primary difficulties:  1) the long latency periods fol-
lowing exposure to toxic/radioactive substances allow for possible involvement of
“intervening causes” that obscure the connection between plaintiff’s exposure and
his illness; 2) the “non-specific” nature of the toxic injury obscures the causal con-
nection and differentiates it from traumatic injures which are much easier to trace;
3) the difficulty in distinguishing a disease caused by toxic exposure from diseases
that are attributable to either natural or spontaneous causes. Id.  at 405-06.
62
Radiation injury occurs at the cellular level.  The interaction between radi-
ation and cellular water causes toxicity within the cell.  This cell damage
can affect an organism in four different ways: (1) cell damages may be
repaired without injury to the organism; (2) cell damage may cause cell
death; (3) the cell may continue to function but lose its reproductive capa-
bilities; and (4) the cell damage may go unrepaired and may modify the
cell’s code for reproduction.
Craig A. Barr, A Practical Guide to Proving and Disproving Causation in Radiation
Exposure Cases:  Hanford Nuclear Site and Radioactive Iodine , 31 GONZ. L. REV. 1,
4 (1995-1996).  Cancer develops in the fourth scenario. Id.
63 Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation ,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 738, 744 (1984).  Such a scenario obviously differs from a
more traditional tort scenario in a number of important ways.  As an example, if a
plaintiff is injured when he is hit by a negligent motorist who failed to yield at a
pedestrian crosswalk, none of the issues inherent in toxic tort litigation need be ad-
dressed.  There is a clear, observable causal chain because any witness to the acci-
dent will testify that they saw the car hit the plaintiff and moments later saw the
plaintiff with a broken leg.  There is no possible alternate explanation for how the
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Despite the differences between injury in traditional and toxic
tort cases, courts continue to require plaintiffs in toxic tort litiga-
tion to meet the same burden of proof on causation as traditional
tort plaintiffs.64  As a result, plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation have
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, that
“but for” the defendants’ release of radioactive emissions, they
would not have been injured.  The disparity then between toxic
tort litigation and more traditional tort litigation lies in the signif-
icant substantive impediments plaintiffs encounter in attempting
to satisfy the preponderance-of-evidence burden.
Because of the practical limitations that result from the tracea-
bility issues and long latency periods, the goal of toxic tort plain-
tiffs in most cases is not to prove the existence of a specific,
verifiable and direct link between their illness and exposure.  In-
stead, they seek to prove that there is a sufficiently high
probability  that their exposure to a given substance caused their
injuries to allow imposition of liability.65  To accomplish this goal,
toxic tort plaintiffs necessarily rely on scientific evidence, includ-
ing the results of epidemiological studies66 and expert testimony
based upon those studies, to sufficiently satisfy causation.67
B. The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence and
Expert Testimony
Probability of causation based on epidemiological studies and
expert testimony typically plays a pivotal role in determining
whether the plaintiff will prevail in a toxic tort case.  Therefore,
evidentiary challenges to the admissibility of such evidence, like
the summary judgment motion filed by the defendants in In re
plaintiff’s leg was broken and the plaintiff would not have to expend any resources
to establish the obvious fact that the driver of the car caused the injury.
64 Callahan, supra  note 58, at 609.
65 See  Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links:  The Role of Scien-
tific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation , 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469 (1998).
66 See  Black & Lilienfeld, supra  note 63, at 738-39.  Epidemiology is defined as
the study of the incidence, determinants, distribution, and control of disease in
human populations. Id.  at 736.  Accordingly, epidemiological studies are under-
taken to explore and clarify a possible association between a toxin and a disease
within a given population. Id.
67 See Barr, supra  note 62, at 19 (“Expert testimony for both epidemiological
studies and experimental evidence is indispensable.”). See also  Black & Lilienfeld,
supra  note 63, at 738 (explaining that to establish causation in toxic tort cases plain-
tiffs usually must rely on expert witnesses and the results of epidemiological studies).
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Hanford , are a critical part of nearly every toxic tort case.68  The
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  governs the standard of admissibility for
such scientific evidence.69
In Daubert , the Supreme Court held that the recently enacted
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 70270 had displaced the tradi-
tional Frye71 test of admissibility for scientific testimony.  Under
Frye , the determinative factor for admissibility of scientific evi-
dence was the “general acceptance” of such evidence within the
relevant scientific community.72  Under Frye , data based on
novel and/or cutting edge scientific research were often excluded
because consensus within the scientific community as a whole,
rather than the particular judge hearing the case, determined ad-
missibility.73  Under Daubert , however, the Supreme Court
charged trial judges with the duty to act as “gatekeepers” of sci-
entific testimony.74
This new gatekeeping function required trial courts to assess
the admissibility of scientific evidence and testimony using a two-
prong analysis.  First, from FRE 702’s phrase “scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge” the Supreme Court derived
a standard of reliability:75  To be sufficiently reliable, scientific
evidence must have a “grounding in the methods and procedures
of science,” that is, be “derived by the scientific method” and
amount to more than “subjective belief or unsupported specula-
tion.”76  Second, from FRE 702’s phrase “assist the trier of fact,”
the Supreme Court set a standard of relevance:77  The expert tes-
timony must “fit” the case for which it is proffered, meaning that
the testimony must be “relevant to the task at hand” in that it
68 See , e.g. , Michael V. Cires & Martha K. Wivell, Protecting Your Evidence
Against “Junk Science” Attacks , TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 35.
69 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
70 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: “If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
71 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
72 Daubert , 509 U.S. at 589.
73 Kristina L. Needham, Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony
After  Daubert, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 544-45 (1998).
74 Id.
75 See  Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation , 74
TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
76 Daubert , 509 U.S. at 594.
77 Feldman, supra  note 75, at 8.
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“logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s
case.”78  The Supreme Court articulated four factors to guide
courts in evaluating whether proffered scientific evidence consti-
tuted scientific knowledge that would assist the trier of fact in
understanding or determining a fact at issue:  testability, peer re-
view and publication, rate of error, and general acceptance.79
After announcing the new standards for admissibility of scien-
tific evidence, the Supreme Court remanded Daubert  back to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings.80 The
Ninth Circuit’s ruling on remand (known as Daubert II) was the
first decision to apply the Supreme Court’s two-pronged, reliabil-
ity/relevance test for the admissibility of scientific testimony and
evidence.81
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Daubert Ruling
In Daubert II , the Ninth Circuit reconsidered the dismissal of a
toxic tort suit brought on behalf of two children against Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals.82  The children suffered from limb reduc-
tion birth defects alleged to have been caused by their mother’s
ingestion of the morning sickness drug Bendectin.83  Like nearly
all toxic tort cases, the plaintiffs had sought to establish causation
through introduction of expert testimony that was based in large
part on data from epidemiological studies.84  The Ninth Circuit
was therefore required to evaluate the reliability and relevance
of plaintiffs’ scientific evidence in light of Daubert ’s new stan-
dard of admissibility.
Applying the reliability prong to the facts of the case, the
Ninth Circuit noted that several factors weighed against admit-
ting plaintiffs’ expert testimony.85  First, none of the experts had
conducted any studies on Bendectin prior to being hired as ex-
perts.86  Second, none of plaintiffs’ experts had ever published or
78 Daubert , 509 U.S. at 591, 597.
79 Id.  at 593-94.
80 Id.  at 598.
81 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
82 The United State District Court for the Southern District of California had ear-
lier granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See  Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
83 Daubert , 43 F.3d at 1313.
84 Id.  at 1320.
85 Id.  at 1317.
86 Id.
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solicited formal review for any of their studies.87  The court held:
“We’ve been presented with only the experts’ qualifications, their
conclusions and their assurances of reliability.  Under Daubert ,
that’s not enough.”88  Plaintiffs’ failure to pass muster under the
reliability prong led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that remand
might be appropriate so that the plaintiffs could augment their
experts’ reports in light of Daubert ’s new requirements.  How-
ever, the court felt that remand was appropriate only if the plain-
tiffs could satisfy the relevance prong of admissibility.89
The Ninth Circuit construed the relevance or “fit” standard as
requiring a “valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as
a precondition to admissibility.”90  The court held that “[h]ere,
the pertinent inquiry is causation.”91  Plaintiffs had sought to es-
tablish causation using expert testimony.  The court held that
such proof was permitted, but that plaintiffs had to carry the
traditional burden of proof by establishing that their injuries re-
sulted from ingestion of Bendectin and not some other indepen-
dent factor.92  The court concluded:  “[T]his means that plaintiffs
must establish not just that their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin
increased somewhat the likelihood of birth defects, but that it
more than doubled it—only then can it be said that Bendectin is
more likely than not the source of their injury.”93  The court also
held that for an epidemiological study to demonstrate causation
under a preponderance standard, the relative risk of limb reduc-
tion defects would have to exceed two.94  None of plaintiffs’ ex-
perts had so concluded.95  The Ninth Circuit concluded that
under Daubert ’s relevance requirement, studies with a relative
risk of less than two would not be helpful and would “only serve
to confuse the jury.”96  Based on this holding, the court upheld
summary judgment for defendant Merrell Dow.97
87 Id.  at 1318.
88 Id.  at 1319.





94 Id.  at 1321.  In Daubert II , because the background data of limb reduction de-
fects was roughly one per thousand births, the court held that plaintiffs would have
to show that the incidence of such defects was more than two per thousand among
children of mothers who took Bendectin. Id.  at 1320.
95 Id.  at 1321-22.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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The breadth of the Ninth Circuit’s application of Daubert ’s rel-
evance standard proved to be the primary point of contention
between the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in In re Hanford .  The district court interpreted the Ninth
Circuit’s relevance analysis in Daubert II  as setting a threshold
evidentiary requirement, under which scientific evidence and ex-
pert opinion that did not demonstrate a relative risk of greater
than two was necessarily excluded as irrelevant.  On its face that
was the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Daubert II .  In In re Han-
ford , however, the Ninth Circuit was able to distinguish its own
holding by concluding that although a relative risk of greater
than two is generally a requirement for satisfying Daubert ’s rele-
vance prong, the relative risk calculation does not act as a thresh-
old evidentiary requirement when the capability of a substance




As In re Hanford  and Daubert  illustrate, the ability of a plain-
tiff to establish causation in toxic tort litigation typically turns on
whether plaintiff’s scientific evidence and expert testimony are
admissible to help establish the probability that exposure to a
toxic/radioactive substance, rather than some independent factor,
caused plaintiff’s injury.  The standard of relevance most courts
use to determine the admissibility of such evidence examines
whether the scientific evidence demonstrates a “doubling of the
risk,” or, as some courts formulate it, whether the data demon-
strate a “relative risk” of greater than two.  It is important to
understand both the predicate rationale courts employ to justify
their reliance on relative risk calculations as well as the basic
methods employed by scientists and statisticians in calculating ac-
tual relative risk values.
A. Calculating Relative Risk and Probability of Causation
A relative risk value is derived from epidemiological studies of
human populations exposed to a particular substance.98  Relative
98 See  Roy Alan Cohen & Jodi F. Mindnich, Expert Testimony and the Presenta-
tion of Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort and Environmental Hazardous Substance
Litigation , 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009, 1035-36 (1991); Jon Todd Powell, How to
Tell the Truth With Statistics:  A New Statistical Approach to Analyzing the Bendectin
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risk represents the degree of likelihood that an individual ex-
posed to a particular toxic substance will contract a given disease
compared to the degree of likelihood that an unexposed individ-
ual will contract the same disease.99  Put another way, relative
risk equals the “risk of disease in a population segment exposed
to a particular substance, divided by the risk of disease in the rest
of the population.”100  When the relative risk value of an epide-
miological study equals one, there are identical proportions of
persons with the disease in both the exposed group and the unex-
posed group, thus demonstrating the absence of any observable
association between exposure to a substance and the onset of dis-
ease.101  A relative risk figure of more than one, however, indi-
cates that there are a greater number of people within the
exposed population who have contracted a particular disease
than in the unexposed population.102  Thus, a relative risk of
more than one demonstrates the existence of an observable asso-
ciation between exposure to a substance and the onset of disease.
Once a relative risk value is derived, it is often used to calcu-
late a probability of causation (“PC”) formula.103  The PC
formula is defined as the percentage of risk in the exposed popu-
lation that is attributable to the substance under analysis, and it is
calculated using the following formula:  PC=1-1/x, where “x” is
the relative risk.104 The following hypothetical illustrates how a
relative risk value is used to calculate a PC formula, which, in
turn, produces a meaningful figure for use in analyzing causation
Epidemiological Data in the Aftermath of  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
31 HOUS. L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1994).
99 Thompson, supra  note 60, at 250-51.
100 Id.
101 Cohen & Mindnich, supra  note 101, at 1035; Thompson, supra  note 60, at 251.
For example, a relative risk value would equal one if epidemiological studies indi-
cated that a specific type of cancer developed in one out of every one thousand
individuals within a population segment after widespread exposure to a particular
toxic substance, but studies indicated that the normal background rate for that same
type of cancer was also one out of every one thousand.
102 Thompson, supra  note 60, at 251; see also  Cohen & Mindnich, supra  note 101,
at 1035; Powell, supra  note 98, at 1251-52.  For example, a relative risk value of two
would be derived when an epidemiological study indicated that a specific type of
cancer developed in two out of every one thousand individuals within a population
segment exposed to a particular toxic substance, where the background rate for that
same type of cancer was only one out of every one thousand individuals.
103 See  Cohen & Mindnich, supra  note 101, at 1035; Mark Parascandola, What Is
Wrong with the Probability of Causation? , 39 JURIMETRICS J. 29, 31 (1998); Powell,
supra  note 101, at 1251.
104 Powell, supra  note 98, at 1254; Parascandola, supra  note 103, at 31-32.
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in toxic tort litigation.105
If there are 150 cases of a disease within a population segment
of 1,000 people who were exposed to a particular toxic substance,
and only 100 cases of the same disease in a similar population of
1,000 people who were not exposed to the toxic substance, the
applicable relative risk value is 1.5.106  Once a relative risk of 1.5
is derived, the PC formula discussed above is used to arrive at a
probability of causation equal to .33, or 33%.107  Therefore, when
150 exposed individuals within a population of 1,000 develop a
disease where normally only 100 out of 1,000 individuals would
develop the same disease, there is only a 33% probability that
exposure to the toxic substance in question, rather than some
other independent factor, caused any one individual’s disease.
However, using this same methodology, if there had been 300
instances of a particular disease in an exposed population where
only 100 individuals would normally have contracted the disease,
the relative risk would be 3.0 and the probability of causation
105 It is important to point out that the discussion herein concerning the use of
epidemiological evidence is necessarily limited in its scope and not an exhaustive
analysis of the scientific underpinnings of epidemiological evidence or the complex
mathematical calculations that such studies routinely entail.  Many commentators,
however, have written extensively on such issues. See , e.g. , David W. Barnes, Too
Many Probabilities:  Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation , 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 191, 198-205 (2001) (detailing statistical calculations used by epidemiologists
to interpret data, including concepts of statistical sampling, experimental design and
measurement, statistical modeling, hypothesis testing, and extrapolation); Andrew
A. Marino & Lawrence E. Marino, The Scientific Basis of Causality in Toxic Tort
Cases , 21 U. DAYTON. L. REV. 1, 6-22 (1995) (explaining a number of principles
relating to the use of epidemiology in the courtroom including dependent variables,
dosimetry, risk factors, systemic variation, internal versus external validity, and rate
of error); Bruce R. Parker, Understanding Epidemiology and its Use in Drug and
Medical Device Litigation , 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 35, 35-56 (1998) (explaining different
types of epidemiological studies including prospective cohort studies, retrospective
cohort studies, case-control studies, nested case-control studies; as well as factors
that may contribute to unreliability within those studies such as selection bias, mea-
surement bias, confounding factors, and random chance; as well as tools used to
interpret statistical data arrived at in epidemiological studies such as standard devia-
tion, confidence intervals, and rates of error); Thompson, supra  note 60, at 268-74
(examining epidemiological principles including statistical association, temporality,
biological plausibility and coherence, dose-response, consistency, analogy, experi-
mental evidence, and specificity).
106 A relative risk value of 1.5 is arrived at by dividing 150 (the number of cancers
in the exposed population) by 100 (the number of cases in the unexposed
population).
107 A 33% probability of causation is arrived at when the relative risk value is 1.5
through the following calculation: probability of causation equals one minus one
divided by 1.5; i.e., [1 – (1/1.5)], which equals [1 – .66] which equals .33, or 33%
probability of causation.
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would be 67%.108  Thus, in this second hypothetical, there would
be a 67% chance that a given individual within the exposed pop-
ulation had contracted their disease through exposure to the
toxic substance in question, rather than some other independent
factor.
B. Application of the Preponderance of Evidence Standard to
the Relative Risk Value
In the second example above, the relative risk of 2.0 results in
there being a 50% probability that plaintiffs contracted their dis-
ease through exposure to the toxic substance in question, rather
than some independent variable.  Applying the relative-risk stan-
dard to the legal requirement that a plaintiff prove causation by a
preponderance of the evidence (i.e., prove it is more probable
than not that “but for” exposure to the substance in question the
illness would not have occurred) it is easy to see why many courts
have concluded that a relative risk of greater than two is impor-
tant evidence for making a determination regarding causation.
When relative risk is more than two, and the corresponding
probability of causation is greater than 50%, civil courts applying
the preponderance-of-evidence standard can reasonably con-
clude that a given plaintiff’s disease was more likely than not
caused by exposure to the chemical in question.109
108 A 67% probability of causation is arrived at where the relative risk value is 3.0
through the following calculation: probability of causation equals one minus one
divided by 3.0; i.e., [1 – (1/3.0], which equals [1 – .33] which equals .67, or 67%
probability of causation.
109 Before the rise of epidemiology as the central means for plaintiffs to establish
probability of causation in the toxic tort context, commentators observed two dis-
tinct views concerning the scientific proof needed to satisfy the preponderance of
evidence standard. See  Rosenberg, supra  note 60, at 867.  The so called “strong”
version of the preponderance rule maintained that a plaintiff could not prevail on his
claim without producing both statistical correlations from epidemiological studies
indicating that the relative risk exceeded two and  particularistic evidence providing
direct and specific proof of a causal relationship between the substance in question
and an individual plaintiff’s injuries. Id.  at 869.  In contrast, some courts used the
“weak” version of the preponderance rule under which a plaintiff could prevail by
merely coming forward with evidence regarding the statistical correlation between
the chemical in question and his disease.  Id.  at 874-75.  Over time, the “weak” ver-
sion gained prominence, such that the distinction between the two views is no longer
made. See  Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases:  The Interplay of Adjec-
tive and Substantive Law , 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 119 n.124 (2001).
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C. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.110 provides a typical example
of a trial court exercising its “gatekeeping” role to exclude plain-
tiffs’ scientific testimony under the preponderance rule.  Holding
that a relative risk of less than two fails to satisfy Daubert ’s rele-
vance prong,111 Hall  involved litigation over plaintiffs’ “atypical
connective tissue disease” (ACTD), a condition allegedly caused
by the rupture and/or degradation of plaintiffs’ silicone breast
implants.112  In December 1996, the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon granted defendants’ motions in limine
to exclude plaintiffs’ expert testimony concerning causation.113
The court analyzed the issue by applying Daubert ’s two-pronged
admissibility test,114 and held that for plaintiffs’ proffered epide-
miological evidence on causation to meet the reliability require-
ment, “the relative risk . . . arising from the epidemiological
data . . . will, at a minimum, have to exceed [two].”115  Plaintiffs’
experts based their opinions upon sixteen published epidemio-
logical studies assessing the relationship of silicone breast im-
plants and connective tissue disease.116  The court noted that the
highest relative risk demonstrated by any of the plaintiffs’ studies
was only 1.24.117  The court concluded:  “Therefore, these studies
cannot support expert testimony that silicone ‘more likely than
not’ causes disease or signs and symptoms of disease in wo-
110 Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D.Or. 1996).
111 See id.  at 1411-14.
112 Id.  at 1391.  The defendants in Hall  included Baxter Healthcare Co., Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, and Dow Corning Corp. Id.
at 1391 n.1.
113 Id.  at 1394.
114 Id.  at 1396.  The court wrote “The task before this court . . . is two-pronged.
First, the court must determine whether plaintiff’s experts’ testimony reflects ‘scien-
tific knowledge,’ . . . and was ‘derived by the scientific method.’  Second, the court
must ensure that the proposed testimony ‘fits,’ that is, that the testimony is ‘relevant
to the task at hand’ in that it ‘logically advances a material aspect of the proposing
party’s case.’” Id.
115 Id.  at 1403 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321
(9th Cir. 1995)).
116 Id.  at 1404.
117 Id.  at 1405.  Plaintiffs offered one other study, referred to in the opinion as the
“Liang-Schottenfeld abstract,” that reported a relative risk of 2.27 for undifferenti-
ated connective tissue diseases in breast implant patients. Id.  at 1404.  The court
refused to consider this study, however, because it was unpublished, and because the
study only included three women with breast implants, thus severely calling into
question its epidemiological significance. Id.  at 1405.
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men.”118  As a result, the court excluded every scientific study
put forth by the plaintiffs and ruled that not a single one of plain-
tiffs’ experts would be allowed to testify.119  The motion in limine
was accordingly granted.120
IV
CRITIQUING JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON RELATIVE RISK
AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
Since 1982, at least thirty-one court opinions, including In re
Hanford , Daubert , and Hall , have addressed the question of rel-
ative risk in toxic tort litigation.121  In twelve of those cases,
courts held that a relative risk of greater than two is necessary to
support a reasonable inference of causation.122  However, in
fourteen other cases, courts held that a relative risk of greater
than two was not a strict requirement.123  Similarly, of the
twenty-one cases addressing whether expert opinion on causa-
tion must be based on data indicating a relative risk of more than
two, ten courts held in the affirmative while eleven declined to
adopt such a requirement.124
Given courts’ divergent treatment of relative risk, it is not sur-
prising that commentators are similarly divided.  Some commen-
tators criticize overreliance by courts on relative risk.  These
authors contend that the relative risk calculation, and the epide-
miological data upon which such calculations are based, are not
proper grounds for awarding recovery in toxic tort litigation.125
On the other side of the argument are numerous other commen-
tators who argue that relative risk calculations and epidemiologi-
cal data actually fail to take into account many injuries that
should be compensible under tort law.  These authors conclude
that any relative risk values demonstrating a positive correlation
between exposure to toxic/radioactive substances and later onset
of disease are relevant and should be considered at trial.126
118 Id.  at 1405.
119 Id.  at 1414-15.
120 Id.  at 1414.
121 Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater Than Two
in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation , 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195, 197 (2001).
122 Id.  at 200.
123 Id.  at 201.
124 Id.  at 201-02.
125 See infra  notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
126 See infra  notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
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A. Arguments That Courts Put Too Great an Emphasis on
Epidemiological Evidence and Relative
Risk Calculations
One major criticism of judicial reliance on relative risk calcula-
tions comes from epidemiologists and statisticians.  These com-
mentators argue that, although adoption of the greater-than-two
rule by courts is theoretically sufficient to meet the requirements
of the civil preponderance-of-evidence standard, it completely ig-
nores the weight that scientists give to relative risk values.127  Ep-
idemiologists have long considered relative risk values of less
than three as indicative of only a weak association between expo-
sure and disease occurrence since it could be due entirely to
flaws in either study design or data analysis.128  These experts ar-
gue that epidemiologists do not consider a strong association be-
tween exposure and onset of disease to exist until studies
demonstrate relative risk values exceeding four,129 with some ex-
perts arguing that epidemiologists only consider relative risk val-
ues exceeding eight as indicating a strong correlation.130  Owing
to what they perceive as the disconnect between legally sufficient
statistical correlations and scientifically sufficient statistical cor-
relations, these commentators argue that if reliance upon weak
associative correlations such as relative risk values below four is
to continue, such evidence should not be applied with “certainty”
to plaintiffs in the absence of other particularized proof of
causation.131
In addition to science-based critiques of how courts use epide-
miological data and relative risk calculations, a number of com-
mentators have put forward more policy-based objections.
Preeminent among such commentators is Michael Dore of
127 Thompson, supra  note 60, at 259.
128 Bert Black et al., Expert Evidence:  A Practitioner’s Guide to Law, Science, and
the FJC Manual , 7 ALI-ABA 115, 130 (2002) (citing David E. Lilienfeld, Overview
of Epidemiology , 3 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCIENTIFIC EVID. Q. 25, 26 (1995)).
129 Id.
130 Thompson, supra  note 60, at 289.
131 Id.  at 290.  Specifically, Thompson argues that moderate associations, meaning
those based on relative risk values of between three and eight, are sufficiently pro-
bative of causation if such results are “coupled with strength in other epidemiologi-
cal causation guidelines, such as a ‘strong temporal relationship.’” Id.  at 289.  She
then argues that with weak associations, “the plaintiff should probably show
strength in other epidemiological causation guidelines and, in addition, similarity
between the plaintiff and those in the study population.” Id.  Thompson’s argu-
ments come close to advocating a return to the “strong” preponderance of the evi-
dence standard discussed supra  in note 112.
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Harvard Law School.132  Professor Dore’s critique is grounded in
the observation that epidemiological evidence is proof not of ac-
tual, individual causation , but is only demonstrative of the rela-
tive level of risk to which a defendant’s activities exposed
members of plaintiff’s group and this risk does not specifically
relate to any individual plaintiff’s illness.133  Professor Dore ar-
gues:  “[C]ourts that fail to distinguish the issue of risk from that
of actual causation may accordingly, but erroneously, permit the
evidence of risk to establish causation.”134  He notes that the in-
herent limits of epidemiology as a tool for use in the courtroom
are a result of its general and statistical nature.  Epidemiological
studies are general, he argues, because they deal with sources of
disease in groups of people rather than in individuals.  Moreover,
because such studies are statistical, they quantify probabilities
and can only show whether a defendant’s conduct increased
plaintiff’s risk to some statistically measurable extent; thus, it is
utterly impossible for epidemiology to answer the critical ques-
tion of whether the defendant’s conduct actually injured a spe-
cific plaintiff.135
132 See  Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in
Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact , 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429 (1983).  Professor
Dore’s 1983 commentary is cited in virtually every law review article and court opin-
ion critiquing overreliance on relative risk calculations.
133 Id. See  Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Na-
ked Statistics, and Proof:  Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts , 73
IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1011-12 (1988) (arguing that particularistic evidence is a neces-
sary prerequisite for proving actual causation).
134 Dore, supra  note 132, at 436.  For an earlier iteration of Professor Dore’s argu-
ment see Louis L. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated , 1 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1951).
Professor Jaffe argues:
Abstract probability may play a role in finding a fact, but what is referred
to in the traditional formula is the greater probability in the case at hand.
The ‘probabilities’ in the abstract or statistical sense is only a datum.  The
jury’s quest for the fact can only be undertaken if there is evidence in addi-
tion to that upon which the mere abstraction is based which will enable the
jury to make a reasoned choice between the competing possibilities. . . .
There must be a rational , i.e., evidentiary basis on which the jury can
choose the competing probabilities.  If there is not, the finding will be
based . . . on mere speculation and conjecture.
Id. See also , Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:  Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process , 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1341 (1971) (concluding it is not enough that
“the mathematical chances somewhat favor the proposition” to be proved).
135 Dore, supra  note 132, at 435-36.  Commentators have rebutted Professor
Dore’s critique by arguing that he incorrectly framed the principles of toxic tort
causation. See  Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology:
A Response to Mr. Dore , 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.  441, 445-46 (1983).  These au-
thors argue that the real issue in toxic tort litigation is whether sufficient evidence
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE208.txt unknown Seq: 26  1-MAR-04 13:43
606 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
The strength of Professor Dore’s argument—that the statistical
nature of epidemiological evidence renders it an improper basis
for proving individual causation—was illustrated by Professor
Charles Nesson in his famous “blue bus” hypothetical:
While driving late at night on a dark, two-laned road, a person
confronts an oncoming bus speeding down the center line of
the road in the opposite direction.  In the glare of the head-
lights, the person sees that the vehicle is a bus, but cannot oth-
erwise identify it.  He swerves to avoid a collision, and his car
hits a tree.  The bus speeds past without stopping.  The injured
person later sues the Blue Bus Company.  He proves, in addi-
tion to the facts stated above, that the Blue Bus company
owns and operates 80% of the buses that run on the road
where the accident occurred.  Can he win?136
The hypothetical demonstrates the shortcomings of judicial re-
liance on pure statistical evidence to establish proof of causation
in a manner similar to Dore’s critique.  Both authors are wary of
the unfairness that would result if liability were imposed on a
non-negligent defendant due solely to reliance on statistical,
rather than particularized, causal evidence.137
exists to infer that it is more probable than not that a given exposure caused the
plaintiff’s disease. Id.  The statistical evidence generated by epidemiology is highly
probative of just that issue. Id.  at 456.  In fact, these authors point out that signature
diseases, which are usually not perceived as presenting difficult individual causation
issues, are simply cases in which the statistical evidence is highly persuasive because
the background incidence of disease is low compared to the incidence in the exposed
population. Id.  at 446-47. See also  Thomas M. Reavley & Daniel A. Petalas, A Plea
for Return to Evidence Rule 702 , 77 TEX. L. REV. 493, 504 n.72 (1998) (criticizing
Professor Dore’s position by noting, “Epidemiological evidence can be probative
and can yield a basis for assigning explanatory force to an expert’s conclusion, de-
spite the individual attribution uncertainty.”).
136 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accept-
ability of Verdicts , 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378-79 (1985).
137 See , e.g ., Senn v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988) (per
curium).  In Senn , plaintiff sought to recover damages due to the debilitating injuries
she suffered from a DPT vaccination. Id.  at 612-13.  Plaintiff joined the only two
drug manufacturers that had produced the vaccine.  Sean v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 259 (Or. 1988).  She could not establish which of the two had
actually manufactured the particular dose she was given, but the evidence did estab-
lish that one defendant had approximately 70% of the market share for the vaccine,
while the other defendant had approximately 30% market share. Id.  at 259 n.1.
Plaintiffs urged the Oregon Supreme Court to hold the companies liable under an
alternative liability scheme, but the court refused, citing the “violence” such schemes
do to the causation element of tort law. Id.  at 269.  Despite the fact that the com-
pany with the majority market share had more probably than not caused plaintiff’s
injury, the court cited the fundamental unfairness that would result from imposing
liability against a non-negligent defendant based purely on statistical evidence that it
controlled a majority share of the market at the time plaintiff was injured. See id .
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Other commentators have rebutted the implied conclusion of
the blue bus hypothetical by pointing out that the situation
presented by Professor Nesson differs significantly from the typi-
cal toxic tort case.138  In the blue bus hypothetical, judicial reli-
ance on statistical proof would be particularly questionable
because the data would be used to prove both the identity of the
defendant and, by extension, negligence and causation.139  This
contrasts with the typical toxic tort case, such as In re Hanford ,
where statistics are employed only after a defendant has been
identified and only after plaintiff’s exposure to a particular toxic
substance due to the defendant’s negligence has been estab-
lished; thus, in the typical toxic tort case, statistical evidence is
used to establish only causation, and, accordingly, is less
suspect.140
An argument developed more fully in subsequent articles by
Professor Nesson concerned the existence of “legal probability”
as a distinct concept from pure scientific probability.141  In this
formulation, legal probability is not a strict mathematical concept
but one that incorporates within it the idea of justice.142  Under
this line of reasoning, an outcome is legally probable if it “best
accomplishes a just and acceptable resolution of the dispute.”143
Professor Nesson thus wrote, “This suggests that the acceptabil-
ity of a conclusion is not a simple function of mathematical
probability, but rather is a complex matter of communication
that depends on the nature of the issue, the process of decision,
138 See , e.g. , Thompson, supra  note 60, at 265.
139 Id.  at 266.
140 Thompson put forth her own hypothetical, asking the reader to ponder the
role of statistics in establishing only the issue of causation. Id.  That scenario is as
follows:
While standing in a large crowd at the bus station, a man becomes aware
that a bus from the Blue Bus Company is nearing the crowd.  The bus pulls
into the station, and the crowd moves to stay clear of the bus.  The man,
although jostled somewhat by the crowd, does not appear to have been
injured.  Two years later, he develops pain in his lower back, and x-rays
reveal a slipped disc.  He sues the Blue Bus Company.  He proves, in addi-
tion to the facts states above, that statistics indicate it is dangerous for bus-
ses to drive near crowds because this can cause injuries to those in the
crowd.  In addition, he proves that there are more back injures in crowd-
related accidents than would be normally expected. Can he win?
Id.
141 Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus:  Factfinding at the Frontier
of Knowledge , 66 B.U. L. REV. 521, 521 (1986).
142 Id.
143 Id.
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and the purposes and audiences the conclusion serves.”144  The
detachment of legal probability from pure scientific probability
recognizes that courts should still be free to use epidemiological
data, even in the absence of particularized proof of causation, in
situations where uncertainty concerning proof of causation inter-
sects with underlying principles of justice.
B. Arguments That the Relative Risk of Greater Than Two Is
Underinclusive of Compensible Injuries
While a number of commentators argue that the uncertainties
upon which epidemiology and risk ratio calculations are based
should preclude overreliance on such data, numerous others
have argued that requiring relative risk values of more than two
prohibits imposition of liability for many injuries that should be
compensable under tort law.  One critique, published by epide-
miologists Sander Greenland and James M. Robins has gained
wide recognition among commentators who argue that requiring
a relative risk of more than two results in underinclusion of ill-
nesses.145  Greenland and Robins claim that the fundamental de-
ficiency of relative risk is its failure to distinguish between
“etiologic” and “excess” cases of cancer.146  An etiologic case is
one where radiation exposure caused a cancer but the cancer
would have occurred without the exposure,147 while an excess
case of cancer is one that would not have occurred without the
exposure.148  For the excess cases, it is clear that the exposure in
question caused the cancers whereas the etiologic cases of cancer
would have occurred anyway.  The relative risk calculation is
conceptually limited, Greenland and Robins argue, because it
can only account for the excess cases of cancer, while principles
of tort recovery support imposition of liability for both the excess
cases and  for those etiologic cases where a defendant’s toxic ex-
posure has hastened the onset of a disease.149  The authors note
that, in a non-toxic tort setting when a physician fails to use an
obvious treatment for a patient’s cancer and this negligence has-
tens the patient’s death, the fact that the patient would have died
144 Id.  at 522.
145 Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Conceptual Problems in the Definitions
and Interpretation of Attributable Fractions , 128 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1185 (1988).
146 Id.  at 1185-86.
147 Id.
148 Id.  at 1190.
149 See id.  at 1191-93.
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anyway does not excuse the physician’s negligence.150
In addition to the inability of relative risk calculations to ac-
count for etiologic cases of disease, commentators point to two
additional inherent flaws in epidemiological studies that can also
result in an underinclusion of illnesses and a relative risk calcula-
tion that is artificially low.  The first of these is the “incomplete
accrual problem,” which is based on the observation that epide-
miological studies are typically undertaken for public health pur-
poses and not for the purpose of supporting litigation.151
Because such studies are done for public health purposes, they
aim to identify risks against which protective measures might be
taken to promote public health—not to discover whether a rela-
tive risk of more than two exists.152  In pursuing this preventative
goal, the positive results of an epidemiological study are usually
published as soon as a statistically significant elevated risk is re-
vealed—without waiting for all possible adverse effects to fully
develop.153  For cancers and other illnesses with long latency pe-
riods, additional cases routinely develop following the original
publication of findings.  These post-publication illnesses are gen-
erally not counted because there is no scientific reason to do so.
As a result, for cancer and other diseases with long latency peri-
ods, the published relative risk is often lower than the actual rela-
tive risk that exists.154
The “healthy worker effect” is another factor resulting in epi-
demiological underinclusivness, and it is based on the fact that
150 The doctrine of “loss of a chance” allows for recovery in similar situations. See
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).  In Herskovits , the
Washington Supreme Court considered whether proof of a plaintiff’s increased risk
of death, due to his decreased chance of survival resulting from a physician’s error,
was sufficient to present the issue of proximate cause to a jury. Id.  at 476.  The court
held: “It is not necessary for a plaintiff to introduce evidence to establish that the
negligence resulted in the injury or death, but simply that the negligence increased
the risk  of injury or death.  The step from the increased risk to causation is one for
the jury to make.” Id.  at 478.  The Herskovitz  court thus concluded that reduction
of a chance of survival from 39% to 25% would be sufficient evidence to allow the
jury to consider the issue of proximate cause. Id.  at 479. See also  Robert S. Bruer,
Loss of a Chance as a Cause of Action in Medical Malpractice Cases , 59 MO. L. REV.
969 (1994) (analyzing the two different approaches to the loss-of-a-chance doctrine:
In one approach courts adopt a relaxed causation standard which treats the underly-
ing injury as the ultimate injury sustained by the plaintiff, usually death; in the other
approach, courts treat the actual loss of a chance as a distinct compensable injury).
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epidemiological studies are often conducted in the workplace.155
Because workers on the whole are healthier than the general
population, their risk of contracting almost any disease is
lower.156  In fact, it is not uncommon for workplace studies to
find a relative risk for mortality from all causes to be in the range
of 0.7 to 0.8.157  As a result, comparing studies conducted on ex-
posed workers with individuals in the general population will
necessarily result in understating the risk of disease that actually
exists.
V
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PREPONDERANCE RULE
A. The Proportionality Rule
Given the divisive scholarly debate concerning the utility and
appropriateness of relying on epidemiological data and relative
risk calculations as evidence of causation in toxic tort litigation, it
is not surprising that commentators have advanced numerous al-
ternatives to the current preponderance-of-evidence rule.158
155 Kenneth L. Mossman & Gary E. Marchant, The Precautionary Principle and
Radiation Protection , 13 RISK 137, 145 (2002).
156 Id.  at 145 n.15.  The principal reasons given by the authors for why workers
are more healthy than non-workers are that chronically unhealthy individuals do not
enter the work force in large numbers and individuals in the workforce typically
have better access to health care than the general population. See id.
157 Id. See also  Carruth & Goldstein, supra  note 121, at 207.  In fact, the healthy
worker effect has been observed in workplace studies conducted at the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation.  Gerald Woodcock & Michelle R. Fox, Hanford and Public
Health:  No Cause for Alarm , 31 GONZ. L. REV. 69, 73 (1996).  In arguing that the
“wealth of health and safety data from a variety of agencies provides strong evi-
dence that there has been no increase in radiologically induced health problems in
the areas surrounding Hanford,” id.  at 69, Woodcock & Fox note that “no group of
people has been closer to the sources of radiation at Hanford than those who have
worked there. . . . [yet the] overall health of Hanford workers is significantly better
than the general population.” Id.  at 73.
158 In addition to the alternatives discussed herein, see Troyen A. Brennan &
Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other
Environmental Diseases in Individuals , 10 HEALTH POL. POL’Y L. 33 (1985) (recom-
mending that legislatures adopt a policy of compensation proportional to risk);
Colin Hugh Buckley, A Suggested Remedy for Toxic Injury:  Class Actions, Epidemi-
ology, and Economic Efficiency , 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 497 (1985) (suggesting
proportional recovery after cost/benefit analysis); Kenneth A. Cohen, Class Actions,
Toxic Torts, and Legal Rules , 67 B.U. L. REV. 581 (1987) (book review) (discussing
premise that instead of being required to prove individual-level causation, plaintiffs
should only be required to prove they are members of a group for which causation
has been established for a particular substance); William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss,
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts:  A Phantom Remedy , 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
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Chief among the suggested alternatives is the “proportionality
rule,” which originally gained prominence through the scholar-
ship of Professor David Rosenberg.159  The proportionality rule
is a burden-shifting scheme that does away with a plaintiff’s
traditional burden of establishing that it is more likely than not
that the defendant’s toxic/radioactive substance, and not some
independent factor, caused plaintiff’s injury.160  Instead, under
the proportionality rule, causation is presumed as soon as a
plaintiff brings forward statistical evidence indicating that the de-
fendant caused injury to a known proportion of the individuals
within an exposed population.161  No individualized proof is re-
quired; instead, courts are free to impose liability and award
compensation to every plaintiff in the exposed population in pro-
portion to the risk that a given defendant created through its
negligent actions or omission.162  If, as would typically be the
case, multiple defendants were involved in the litigation, they
would each be held liable to the plaintiffs for a pro rata share of
the damages.163
The following example illustrates the proportionality rule:164
859 (1981) (arguing for an administrative compensation scheme); Christine M.
Grant, Establishing Causation in Chemical Exposure Cases:  The Precursor Symp-
toms Theory , 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 163 (1982) (advocating for relaxed causation
standards where certain medically consistent and individualized precursors are evi-
dent); Talbot Page, On the Meaning of the Preponderance Test in Judicial Regulation
of Chemical Hazards , 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, 267 (allowing
recovery if probability of causation exceeds a critical value determined by cost/bene-
fit analysis); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:  Reflections on the
DES Cases , 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982) (suggesting a probabilistic approach based on
statistical data); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products , 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997) (advocating for burden shifting after
plaintiffs make a prima facie showing of probability); Wendy E. Wagner, Trans-Sci-
ence in Torts , 96 YALE L.J. 428 (1986) (arguing for adoption of a “qualitative causa-
tion standard,” with burden shifting and negligence requirements).
159 See  Rosenberg, supra  note 60, at 866 (“[T]he proportionality rule is ideally
suited to the task of resolving the problem of causal indeterminacy in mass exposure
cases.”); see also  David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Stan-
dard:  Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation , 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 487, 495-502 (1982) (proposing a shift to the proportionality rule of
causation).
160 Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff:  An
Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs , 46
UCLA L. REV. 1289, 1313 (1999).
161 Id.  at 1313; Callahan, supra  note 58, at 669.
162 Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1313; Callahan, supra  note 58, at 669.
163 Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1313; Callahan, supra  note 58, at 669.
164 Adopted from In re  “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 838
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).  In In re “Agent Orange” , Judge Weinstein exhaustively considered
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Suppose that in a given population known to have been exposed
to radioactive emissions, there is a normal background level of
1,000 cases of thyroid cancer.  To investigate the effects of radio-
active emissions, an epidemiological study is conducted165 with
the results indicating 1,100 cases of thyroid cancer in the studied
population.  These 100 “extra” cases of cancer would result in a
relative risk calculation well below two, and a corresponding
probability of causation of just nine percent.166  It would be ex-
tremely unlikely for a court employing the preponderance rule to
admit such evidence (or any expert opinion based upon it) under
the relevance prong of Daubert ;167 thus, no plaintiff would be
able to recover damages.
Suppose instead that all 1,100 of the individuals suffering from
thyroid cancer joined in a lawsuit against the five companies re-
sponsible for allowing the radioactive emissions—but this time
the plaintiffs sued in a court that had adopted the proportionality
rule.  Further, assume that expert medical opinion could set the
level of damages at an average of $1,000,000 per cancer.168
Under the proportionality rule, the 100 “extra” cases of thyroid
the pros and cons of several different liability schemes while considering the appro-
priateness of a proposed settlement agreement between American chemical compa-
nies and thousands of Vietnam veterans who claimed injuries resulting from
exposure to dioxins in the defoliant Agent Orange. Id.  at 746-48.  Although Judge
Weinstein did not adopt any particular liability scheme, he wrote favorably concern-
ing the proportionality rule, dismissing criticism that it would, in all likelihood, result
in compensation being paid to individuals whose injuries had not been caused by
exposure to toxic substances. Id.  at 833-43.  Concerning this criticism, Judge Wein-
stein wrote “[n]o matter what system is used, the purpose is to hold a defendant
liable for no more than the aggregate loss fairly attributable to its tortious conduct.
As long as that goal is met a defendant can have no valid objection that its rights
have been violated.” Id.  at 839. See also  Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1313-14 (ex-
plaining the proportionality rule through hypotheticals); Callahan, supra  note 58, at
668-70 (using a hypothetical to explain the scheme).
165 Of course, any such studies would have to be done years or decades after the
exposure had occurred because of the inevitability of long latency periods.
166 See supra  text accompanying notes 103-08.
167 See supra  text accompanying notes 86-91.
168 As Judge Weinstein acknowledged in his In re “Agent Orange”  opinion, “Put-
ting a dollar amount on the damages suffered by individual plaintiffs is, from a real-
world standpoint, a critical part of the solution.” In re  “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).  Judge Weinstein was concerned that
the benefits gained from adjudicating toxic tort claims in the form of class action
lawsuits under the preponderance rule would be lost in the event that individualized
mini-trials were needed to set a specific dollar figure for each plaintiff’s injury. Id.
He noted that the fewer plaintiffs involved in a suit, and the less variation between
those plaintiffs’ injuries, the more generalized and efficient the process would be.
Id.  at 839.  Judge Weinstein concluded that “[a] preferred solution is to pay claims
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cancer would be multiplied by the average $1,000,000 in damages
and a recovery of $100,000,000 in favor of all the plaintiffs would
be awarded.  Since no plaintiff would be able to conclusively es-
tablish that his or her cancer had actually been caused by the
radiation, the total award of $100,000,000 would then be evenly
divided between the 1,100 plaintiffs.  Thus, each plaintiff would
recover $90,000.  The percentage of the award paid by each de-
fendant would then depend on factors such as the total amount
of radiation emitted while that particular defendant was operat-
ing the facility.
B. Variations of the Proportionality Rule
A variation on the compensation structure of the proportional-
ity alternative, known as the “most-likely-victim” approach, is
predicated on the fact that not all individuals within an exposed
population are equally at risk for developing a given disease.169
Instead, risk is determined in part by the extent and duration of
an individual’s exposure and the timing of the exposure during
an individual’s lifetime, as well as multifarious lifestyle factors,
including socioeconomic conditions and independent health vari-
ables such as whether an individual smokes and whether he or
she lives in a heavily polluted city.170  Using individualized fac-
tors such as these, the most-likely-victim scheme takes a more
complex approach to compensation.  It alters the compensation
structure of the proportionality alternative by dividing members
of the exposed population into subgroups composed of individu-
als with similar characteristics and similar risks of developing
cancer from the same general toxic or radiological exposure.171
This occurs after liability has been established.  Starting at the
subgroup with the highest risk level and proceeding downward,
plaintiffs are compensated fully until a defendant has paid dam-
on a fixed and somewhat arbitrary schedule using a ministerial agency” similar to
the process used by Medicaid and Medicare. Id.
169 Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation , 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1220 (1987).  For
criticism of the “most likely victim” approach see John G. Culhane, The Emperor
Has No Causation:  Exposing a Judicial Misconstruction of Science , 2 WIDNER L.
SYMP. J. 185 (1996) (arguing that the “most likely victim” approach and similar al-
ternatives are the “misguided children of frustration” that promote overreliance on
epidemiological data instead of acknowledging the inherent limitations of using cat-
egory-wide surveys to establish particularized injuries).
170 Farber, supra  note 173, at 1243-44.
171 Id.  at 1243-44.
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ages equal to the attributable risk that it negligently created.172
Under this scheme, those individuals in the highest risk levels
would be fully compensated for their injuries, since it would be
more likely that they had in fact contracted their illnesses as a
result of the defendant’s actions, while those classified into the
lower-risk subgroups, whose illnesses are more likely to have al-
ternative causes, would receive no compensation.173
Another variation on the proportionality alternative would al-
low for both apportionment of damages and burden shifting.174
Under this approach, conceived by Professor Richard Delgado,
when a defendant creates an attributable risk that a certain per-
centage of an exposed population will become ill due to the de-
fendant’s activities, the burden would shift to the defendant
company to prove that it did not in fact cause each injury.175  The
defendant could rebut the presumption either by proving
through scientific studies that the probability of it having caused
the injuries to the exposed population was lower than plaintiffs
alleged or by demonstrating that plaintiffs injuries had an alter-
nate cause.176  If the defendant company failed to rebut its pre-
sumption, damages would be apportioned among all plaintiffs
according to the risk of harm that the defendant created in the
exposed population.177
The most recognized benefit of the proportionality rule and its
variants is the high level of deterrence such schemes would occa-
sion on the manufacturers of toxic substances.178  Critics of these
172 Id.  at 1247-54.
173 Id.  at 1254.  The obvious criticism of the “most-likely-victim” approach is that
science lacks the ability to accurately assign a risk-level to any subgroup. See  Calla-
han, supra  note 58, at 669.  However, recent articles have also suggested that within
the near future, progress in mapping of the human genome will allow scientists to
better evaluate an individual’s propensity for developing certain diseases resulting
from exposure to particular toxic substances. See  Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and
Toxic Torts , 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949 (2001).
174 Richard Delgado, Beyond  Sindell:  Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Inde-
terminate Plaintiffs , 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (1982).
175 Id.  at 900.
176 Id.
177 Id.  at 901.
178 See , e.g. , In re  “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 838
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[T]he deterrent effect . . . on producers would be significant.”);
Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1315 (noting that the proportionality rule “achieves opti-
mal deterrence and encourages a defendant to invest most efficiently in care and
safety”); Delgado, supra  note 174, at 893 (“[T]he increased costs [under the propor-
tionality rule] deter the defendant from engaging in the liability generating the
practice.”).
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alternatives, however, note that they have the potential to open
the door to endless litigation.  These critics argue that signifi-
cantly more lawsuits would be filed under the proportionality
rule since recovery would be possible based solely on an increase
in the risk of harm, and that settlements would be more unlikely
as each side emphatically relied on its competing interpretation
of the epidemiological data.179  The primary criticism of propor-
tionality-type schemes, however, is the fact that in every instance
a plaintiff would either be overcompensated or undercompen-
sated for his or her injuries.180  This criticism is particularly co-
gent because under- and overcompensation would be even more
pronounced in cases where relative risk calculations were less
than two—i.e., the exact situation for which the liability scheme
would be adopted.
Overcompensation under the proportionality rule would occur
when a plaintiff received a windfall by recovering a percentage of
damages from a defendant who did not actually cause his or her
injuries.181  When the relative risk of the supporting epidemiolog-
ical studies was less than two this would statistically be the rule,
rather than the exception.  Undercompensation in situations
where the relative risk was less than two would perhaps be even
be more troubling because a plaintiff who had actually developed
illnesses due to a defendant’s wrongful actions would recover
only a fraction of  the actual damages he or she suffered—an
amount that would doubtlessly fail to make them whole again.182
Both Delgado and Rosenberg recognized that proportionality-
type schemes were open to criticism due to the inevitability of
over- and undercompensation, but both authors argued that fair-
ness to a class of individuals, considered as a whole, was a legiti-
mate alternative to individualized justice.183  Thus, both authors
conceptualized their schemes as necessarily shifting away from
individual justice and towards group responsibility and group jus-
tice in the unique situation of mass toxic exposure.  According to
Professor Rosenberg:  “The proportionality rule simply holds the
179 Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1320.
180 Delgado, supra  note 174, at 893-94; Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1320.
181 Delgado, supra  note 174, at 893; Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1319.
182 Brinker, supra  note 160, at 1320.
183 Delgado, supra  note 174, at 888; Rosenberg, supra  note 160, at 884.  For an
analysis of the group responsibility concept of alternative liability schemes, see Rob-
ert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds:  The Shift From Individual to Group Re-
sponsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury , 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473 (1992).
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defendant liable for . . . the losses it has caused in the ‘body’ of
the exposed population. . . . [T]he population as a whole gains no
windfall.  Essentially, the aggregative conception envisions that
courts will assess liability on behalf of the entire exposed popula-
tion. . . .”184  When viewed as a system of group responsibility,
wherein the defendant’s duty is owed to a population as a whole
and under which a plaintiff’s claim is based on injuries suffered
by a group of which he or she was a member, the criticism of
proportionality-type schemes for under- and overcompensation
is dampened—perhaps only because one realizes the necessity,
rather than any innate preference of the group justice concept in
the event of mass toxic exposure.
C. Novel Alternatives to the Preponderance Rule
In addition to the proportionality rule and similar alternatives,
a number of commentators have proposed more radical solutions
for reformulating liability schemes in toxic tort litigation.  The
most widely discussed of these proposals would entirely do away
with the traditional basis of requiring demonstrable evidence that
a defendant’s toxic or radioactive substance caused a particular
plaintiff’s illness.185  Instead, liability in toxic tort litigation would
be based on a showing that a defendant failed to develop and
disclose information necessary to assess the latent risks of a par-
ticular chemical.186  Such a radical solution may be warranted be-
cause conditioning liability on a plaintiff’s ability to prove that
the defendant’s product caused his illness is counterproductive in
that it only “creates incentives on the part of corporations not to
know and not to disclose” information regarding the health ef-
fects and emissions of their chemicals.187  This proposed alterna-
tive would induce corporations to engage in far more scientific
research on the health effects of their chemicals and to make this
data widely available.  This knowledge would in turn provide
greater protection against adverse exposure to hazardous sub-
stances before  such exposures happened.188
184 Rosenberg, supra  note 60, at 884-85.
185 Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:  Notes Towards A New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts , 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).
186 Id.  at 2117-18.
187 Id.  at 2119.
188 Id.  at 2152.
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D. Allen v. United States
Although numerous alternatives to the preponderance rule
have been proposed, and some such as the proportionality alter-
native have found their way into judicial opinions,189 none  of the
schemes discussed above has ever been judicially adopted.  How-
ever, in the notable case of Allen v. United States ,190 Judge Jen-
kins, writing for the District Court of Utah, adopted a
remarkably liberal and pro-plaintiff test to hold the federal gov-
ernment liable for illnesses and deaths caused as a result of radi-
oactive fallout from open-air nuclear bomb tests held in Nevada
during the late 1950s and early 1960s.191
In his 230-page opinion, Judge Jenkins devoted considerable
time to discussing the problems inherent in establishing causation
through reliance on scientific data such as epidemiological stud-
ies.192  He indicated, however, that he had no ideological prob-
lem concerning the utility of such evidence, and stated that, in
answering the question of whether radiation causes cancer, “[w]e
simply mean that a population exposed to a certain dose of radia-
tion will show a greater incidence of cancer than that same popu-
lation would have shown in the absence of the added
radiation.”193  To overcome the significant burdens the plaintiffs
faced before they could establish causation, the court adopted an
analytical framework through which it sought to establish “exclu-
sive factual connections” between the government’s actions and
plaintiff’s injuries.194  For example, the court sought to determine
whether any given plaintiff’s injury was consistent with the kind
of harm that would result from the defendant’s particular risk
creating conduct.195  After noting the burden-shifting scheme as
189 See , e.g. , In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.,  597 F. Supp. 740, 838-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
190 Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on other
grounds , 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
191 Id.  at 257.  The action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act by ap-
proximately 1200 named plaintiffs who alleged more than 500 deaths and injuries.
Id.  at 257-58.  From among the numerous plaintiffs, the district court selected
twenty-four representative claims and held a full trial on those claims to develop a
framework for managing the remainder. Id.  at 258-60. In the end, the court entered
final judgment in favor of plaintiffs on nine of the representative claims, judgment
against the plaintiffs on fourteen of the representative claims, and left one claim
unresolved. Id.  at 420-48.
192 See id.  at 259-63, 404-19.
193 Id.  at 405.
194 Id.  at 406.
195 The court described its rationale by noting that: “The more exclusive the fac-
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adopted by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbot
Laboratories ,196 the Allen  court strongly criticized the govern-
ment for its negligent failure to monitor and record the radiation
exposures of off-site residents, as well as for its failure to issue
warnings about the known risks of radiation or to provide infor-
mation about appropriate precautions—actions which, in the
court’s view, were sufficient to justify shifting the burden of
proof to the government on the issue of causation.197
Based on this rationale, the court adopted a test providing that
once a plaintiff established generic causation through “substan-
tial, appropriate, persuasive and connecting” factors, the burden
of proof would shift to the government to disprove individual
causation.198  The court thus adopted a burden-shifting, substan-
tial-factor test for establishing causation.  The factual connec-
tions the plaintiff needed to satisfy the test included:  1)
plaintiff’s proximity to the test facility; 2) whether plaintiff’s in-
jury was consistent with those known to be caused by radiation;
and 3) the probability that the plaintiff was exposed to dangerous
levels of radiation.199
tual connections that may be established by evidence, the stronger the rational basis
for focusing the tools of legal analysis upon a specific defendant’s conduct.” Id.  at
406.  The specific analysis put forward by the court was:
That the defendant was engaged in a risk-creating conduct of a particular
type, and plaintiff’s injuries are consistent with the kind of harm that is
predicted and observed when such risks are created, makes the factual con-
nection seem even more exclusive—exclusive of other defendants, other
connections, other “causes.”
196 See supra  text accompanying note 58.
197 Allen , 588 F. Supp. at 408-15.
198 Id.  at 415.  The precise test adopted by the court was:
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which
puts an identifiable population group at increased risk, and a member of
that group at risk develops a biological condition which is consistent with
having been caused by the hazard to which he has been negligently sub-
jected, such consistency having been demonstrated by substantial, appro-
priate, persuasive, and connecting factors, a fact finder may reasonably
conclude that the hazard caused the condition absent persuasive proof to
the contrary offered by the defendant.
Id.  The court restated its substantial factor test later in its opinion, stating:
Where it appears from a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of
the defendant significantly increased or augmented the risk of somatic in-
jury to a plaintiff and that the risk has taken effect in the form of a biologi-
cally and statistically consistent somatic injury, i.e., cancer or leukemia, the
inference may rationally be drawn that defendant’s conduct was a substan-
tial factor contributing to plaintiff’s injury.
Id.  at 428.
199 Id.
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After explicitly rejecting a “but-for” preponderance-of-evi-
dence test, Judge Jenkins held that when a plaintiff relied on sta-
tistical evidence in determining the probability that a defendant’s
act rather than some independent factor caused his injury, “The
mechanical application of a ‘greater-than-100%-increase’ test . . .
represents merely the refabrication of the ‘but-for’ test of causa-
tion in mathematical form.”200  The court rejected such an ap-
proach and held instead that statistics derived from
epidemiological data should be “relied upon as a guide rather
than as an answer. . . .”201  The court thus adopted a malleable
definition of statistical relevance that allowed it to assess liability
based on what it concluded was “inherently a question of policy,”
rather than an all-or-nothing determination based on a threshold
statistical correlation.202  Despite the Allen  court’s application of
a substantial factor test in the place of a “but-for” preponderance
rule, and despite its refusal to require any threshold of statistical
proof such as a doubling of the risk, the court denied recovery to
the majority of the twenty-four representative plaintiffs.203
200 Id.  at 418.  The expression “greater-than-100%-risk” has the same meaning as
“relative risk greater than two.”  The court explained the inequities that would result
if a relative risk of more than two was strictly required.  The court noted that under
a strict preponderance of the evidence analysis, a plaintiff who was one of 190 exper-
iencing a disease after exposure, where the background rate of disease showed only
one hundred cases, could not recover. Id.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 See id . at 429-43.  The court gave varying reasons for rejecting plaintiffs’
claims.  Some plaintiffs did not suffer the type of cancer that was shown to be caused
by radiation exposure.  The majority of rejected claims, ten in all, were dismissed
because those plaintiffs could not show any increased incidence of their specific type
of cancers in the exposed population.  Nonetheless, the government did not success-
fully rebut its presumption regarding the claims of nine separate plaintiffs, including
one plaintiff who had contracted leukemia as a child and who introduced studies
demonstrating a relative risk of between 2.5 and 3.5 that were consistent with her
proximity to the test sites and her age group. Id.  at 437-39.  The district court en-
tered judgment in favor of these nine plaintiffs, with damages set in excess of $2.6
million. Id.  at 447.
Three years later, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Allen  decision,
holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were non-justiciable under the “discretionary func-
tion doctrine.”  Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987).  The
discretionary function doctrine is an exception contained within the Federal Tort
Claims Act that protects the federal government from liability arising out of the
performance of, or failure to perform, a discretionary function or duty. See  Giselse
C. Dufort, All the Kings’ Forces or the Discretionary Function Doctrine in the Nu-
clear Age: Allen v. United States, 15 ECOLOGY L. Q. 477, 478 (1988).  The Tenth
Circuit stressed that every test the government conducted in Nevada had been ap-
proved by the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Council, and the
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CONCLUSION
Much of this Note focuses on what level of epidemiologically-
based probability plaintiffs must bring forward on the issue of
causation before a court will hold the defendant liable for creat-
ing an identifiable level of risk in the exposed population.  The
opinions of the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals , respectively, established a rigorous standard of relevance
for epidemiological evidence; thus the idea of probability is
merged with the civil preponderance-of-evidence rule and statis-
tically derived, relative-risk calculations must exceed two before
they are admissible.  In turn, the district court in In re Hanford
interpreted the Daubert  relevance standard as a threshold evi-
dentiary requirement, which meant that, regardless of accepted
scientific opinion or plaintiffs’ particularized evidence, epidemio-
logical studies detailing illnesses consistent with radioactive ex-
posure were nonetheless ruled inadmissible.  The district court’s
holding was then reversed by the Ninth Circuit, which clarified
the Daubert  standard in its own In re Hanford  opinion by hold-
ing that probabilistic, relative-risk calculations should not be
viewed as a threshold requirement in cases where the capability
of a toxic/radioactive substance to cause the type of illnesses
complained of by a plaintiff has already been established.
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit’s In re Hanford  opinion added
to the voluminous scholarship in favor of increased judicial reli-
ance on probability calculations that do not meet the strict re-
quirements of the preponderance of evidence standard.  These
arguments resonate with particular sensibility in cases of mass
toxic exposure where large subpopulations of individuals are ex-
posed to increased levels of risk as a result of government-initi-
ated or government-funded activities undertaken with the
purported goal of benefiting the nation as a whole.  This argu-
ment is typified by Judge Jenkins’s conclusion in Allen  that statis-
tical evidence should act as a guide, not an answer, in reaching
conclusions concerning what is essentially a policy determination,
President of the United States. Allen , 816 F.2d at 1419.  The Tenth Circuit denied
each and every claim filed by plaintiffs holding that “[the] acts of subordinates in
carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions can-
not be actionable.” Id. at 1420 (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797,
811 (1984)); see also  Barry Kellman, Judicial Abdication of Military Tort Accounta-
bility:  But Who Is to Guard the Guards Themselves? , 1989 DUKE L.J. 1597, 1628-34
(1989).
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as well as in Professor Nesson’s observation that probability is
conceptually different in legal versus mathematical contexts and
that, in a legal sense, any “standard” of probability necessarily
changes depending on the nature and purposes of the litigation.
In fact, in two mass toxic tort cases where plaintiffs achieved
some level of success, policy determinations concerning the na-
ture of the duty owed and the purposes underlying the litigation,
rather than the sheer weight of statistical probability regarding
causation, strongly favored the plaintiffs.204  In Allen , this re-
sulted in citizens exposed to nuclear fallout recovering against
the federal government; in In re Agent Orange , Judge Weinstein
approved a settlement between American chemical companies
and Vietnam veterans who had been exposed to the defoliant
Agent Orange.
The ongoing In re Hanford  litigation presents an equally com-
pelling situation for interjecting policy considerations and the
“nature and purpose” of plaintiff’s claims in making a determina-
tion of whether proffered probability of causation evidence is
sufficient to hold defendants liable for the known radiological
risk they created.  This is because the In re Hanford  plaintiffs
were exposed to radiation as a result of government contractors’
refinement of weapons-grade plutonium that was used both dur-
ing World War II and to fuel the Cold War arms race—a situa-
tion seemingly as compelling, from a policy point of view, as both
In re Agent Orange  and Allen .
Yet, as this Note illustrates, the barriers to recovery tradition-
ally faced by toxic tort plaintiffs were initially applied with partic-
ularly unforgiving zeal to the claims of the In re Hanford
plaintiffs.  Although the Ninth Circuit’s reversal will narrow ap-
plication of the preponderance rule on remand, the mere fact
that some of plaintiffs’ evidence is now likely to survive further
pre-trial evidentiary challenges cannot provide much relief, jus-
tice, or hope to the thousands of long-suffering Hanford
204 Judge Weinstein described the plaintiffs’ purposes behind the Agent Orange
litigation as follows:
Vietnam veterans and their families desperately want this suit to demon-
strate how they have been mistreated by the country they love.  They want
it to give them the respect they have earned.  They want it to protect the
public against future harm by the government and chemical companies.
They want a jury “once-and-for-all” to demonstrate the connection be-
tween Agent Orange and the physical, mental and emotional problems
from which many of them clearly do suffer.
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. , 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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downwinders.  The Hanford litigation has crawled along for more
than twelve years, and, as the history of the case demonstrates,
both sides are likely to contest and appeal each and every incre-
mental ruling—virtually guaranteeing prolongment of the litiga-
tion into the next decade.  These delays are particularly troubling
because most of the injuries In re Hanford  plaintiffs sustained
occurred more than fifty-five years ago.  Further negating any
hope of recovery that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling might have gen-
erated for the Hanford downwinders is that In re Hanford  defen-
dant companies have no incentive to settle the litigation due to
the 1957 Price-Anderson Act, which provides each of them with
full indemnity from any damages that might be assessed.205  An-
other factor that makes settlement unlikely is another provision
of the Price-Anderson Act that provides for full reimbursement
of all the defendant companies’ legal fees that to date exceed
forty million dollars.206
In light of these realities and the need for an expeditious and
just remedy for the In re Hanford  plaintiffs, federal legislation
should be enacted.  This legislation would provide damage
awards for those plaintiffs who can establish, with a reasonable
degree of probability, that their injuries were caused by exposure
to radiation emitted from the Hanford facility.  To assure ade-
quate compensation, the preferred liability scheme for such legis-
lation would be based on the burden-shifting, substantial-factor
205 For the indemnity provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (2001).  Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 after a series
of congressional hearings before its Joint Committee on Atomic Energy demon-
strated that “the open-ended liability associated with operating nuclear facilities was
deterring the participation of private parties in the industry.”  Chris Addicott,
Double Indemnity for Operators of Nuclear Facilities? In re Hanford Nuclear Res-
ervation Litigation, the Price-Anderson Act, and the Government Contractor De-
fense , 72 WASH. L. REV. 505, 509 (1997).  The Act draws a distinction between
contractors who operate commercial power plants for the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and those involved with weapons production for the Department of Energy.
Commercial power plant contractors are not  similarly indemnified by the govern-
ment under the Price-Anderson Act. Id.  at 510.  The indemnity covers all weapons
contractors and subcontractors for all liability arising out of a contract activity, with-
out any deductible, shared liability, or other condition on recovery. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(d)(2).  The statute also provides that the government shall indemnify the
contractors for any legal expenses they incur in defending suits arising from nuclear
incidents at their facilities. Id.  All of the In re Hanford  defendants have indemnity
agreements with the government that fall under the Price-Anderson Act.  Addicott,
supra , at 511-12.
206 See Radiation Exposure Claims Can Proceed Against Contractors , 16 No. 4
ANDREWS GOV’T CONT. REP. 11, 18 (July 3, 2002).
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model adopted by the Allen  court and not on the preponderance
standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in In re Hanford .  Such a
scheme would provide greater flexibility concerning the use of
probabilistic evidence and greater recognition of the underlying
policy considerations that necessitate the legislation.  In recent
years there have been several bills introduced that would have
provided relief to individuals exposed to nuclear waste through
utilization of schemes similar to the one used in the Allen
court.207  While none of these bills were enacted, that fact likely
has less to do with any perceived lack of utility for the scheme
and more to do with a lack of immediacy felt by legislators in the
absence of a discernable group of injured individuals, such as the
group that now exists in the case of the In re Hanford  plaintiffs.
Although a legislative remedy would likely result in the un-
dercompensation of plaintiffs in comparison to the potential
damage awards they might receive from successful resolution of
the current litigation,208 the rapidity with which the legislation
could be passed makes this solution reasonably equitable.  This is
especially true because the epidemiological testing and
probability calculations that would be utilized to assess liability
under the proposed legislation have already been conducted and
judicially scrutinized.
Justification for requiring the federal government to enact leg-
islation providing the Hanford downwinders with compensation
for their injuries, rather than allowing the current legal battle to
meander through the court system for the next decade, comes
from the government’s own data demonstrating the massive
amount of airborne radiation that was released from the Hanford
nuclear facility during its four decades of operation.  The initial
legal success gained by defendant companies should not deter
207 See  Toxic Tort Act, H.R. 1049, 96th Cong. §§ 101-101 (1979).  Under H.R.
1049, persons claiming injuries from toxic waste exposure needed only to establish a
“sufficient” relationship between the toxic exposure, the injury, the geographical
proximity, and the temporal extent of their exposure.  Similarly, a bill introduced in
1980 provided that once a claimant made a prima facie showing of causal connec-
tion, the burden of producing evidence shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that
exposure to its toxic chemicals was an insignificant contribution to claimant’s inju-
ries. See  Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to
Environmental Risks:  The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation ,
35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 582-84 (1983).
208 Although it is worth noting that given the huge amount of attorney fees and
costs associated with the Hanford plaintiffs’ suit, the potential “enormity” of recov-
ery cited by the district court in its original In re Hanford  opinion is certainly open
to speculation.
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passage of such legislation since, as this Note demonstrates, their
early court victory stemmed largely from rigid imposition of
traditional tort rules of causation rather than legitimate questions
of fact regarding the high levels of toxic exposure to which indi-
viduals living near the Hanford facility were exposed.  The suf-
fering of the Hanford downwinders has been prolonged for over
half a century, and in the end may only be exacerbated by the
legal system.  While passage of federal legislation will surely re-
quire painful compromises on the part of those who have been
injured by radioactive emissions, it is clearly the best hope that
exists, given the nearly insurmountable barriers that exist for
toxic tort plaintiffs attempting to impose liability by establishing
probability of causation through epidemiological data.
